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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALEM CITY,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

:
:

Case No.
870347-CA

BRUCE

FARNSWORTH,

;

Defendant-Respondent.
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment by the Eighth Circuit
Court, Spanish Fork Department. The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(c).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Is the term "occupied trailer house or mobile home" used
in Salem Zoning Ordinance 3-17 limited to human occupation or
does it also mean use of the trailer house or mobile home for
storage?
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant Farnsworth was charged with improper location
of a trailer house or mobile home in Salem on March 25, 1987,
a Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Salem City
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Zoning Ordinance Section 3-17.
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES
Salem Zoning Ordinance Sections 2-8 and 3-17.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At a pre-trial conference on May 26, 1987, all material
facts were stipulated

to by the parties.

Farnsworth

stipulated that he located a trailer house on his property
within Salem City Limits at the time charged and that such
location was not in a licensed trailer court or mobile home
park.

Farnsworth

further stipulated that at the time

charged, he used the trailer house for storage and the City
stipulated that at the time charged, no one resided in the
trailer house.
The trial court determined that the case must turn on
the definition of the term "occupied trailer house" as used
in Salem Ordinance 3-17 and that since the ordinance did not
define "occupy" that the word should be defined narrowly to
mean human habitation.

The Court therefore entered a verdict

of acquittal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The term "occupied trailer house" as used in Salem
Ordinance 3-17 is not limited to occupancy by human
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habitation,

but i n c l u d e s o t h e r u s e s and in

particular

storage use.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DEFINED
"OCCUPIED TRAILER HOUSE OR MOBILE HOME"
AS USED IN SALEM ZONING ORDINANCE 3-17
AS REQUIRING HUMAN HABITATION.
The applicable Salem ordinance reads as follows:
2-8 Definitions — Mobile Home shall mean a dwelling
unit, except a sectional home or modular home, designed
to be transported after fabrication on its own wheels
or detachable wheels and which is ready for occupancy
as an independent dwelling unit except for connection
to utilities and/or location on a foundation. The term
mobile home shall not include conventional houses which
are manufactured elsewhere and moved into an area for
use as permanent housing.
3-17 Trailer Houses and Mobile Homes. No occupied
trailer I house or mobile home shall be permitted in
Salem City, U t a h , except under the following
conditions:
1. When the trailer house or mobile home is located in
a licensed trailer court or mobile home park.
2. When the trailer house or mobile home is located on
a lot on which a building is being constructed,
provided a permit to construct a building on such lot
has been obtained from the zoning administrator, but in
no event shall the trailer or mobile home be occupied
in excess of one year without consent of the Salem City
Council.
The Trial Court defined

"occupy" as used in the

ordinance to mean "human habitation".
disagrees.

Salem respectfully

The term "occupy" is not expressly defined in

the Salem Ordinance.

Undefined words in a zoning ordinance

will be given their plain and ordinary meaning.

Wiggers vs.

Skagit County, 596 P2d 1345, (Wash. App. 1979) and Town of
3

Greenland v. Bunker, 384 A2d 321 (New Hampshire, 1978).
The

Utah

Supreme Court was confronted

with

the

contention that in order to be an occupant of real property a
claimant must reside thereon.

The Court said

This is not the law.
Occupancy does not
necessarily include residence. Webster defines
"occupancy" as the "act of taking or holding
possession;" and an "occupant" as "one who
occupies, or takes possession; one who has the
actual use or possession, or is in possession, of a
thing." In 2 Ralpj & Lawrence's Dictionary, 893,
we find that "in its usual sense, occupancy is when
a person exercises physical control over land." In
the case of Fleming v. Maddox, 30 Iowa 239 the
court said: "A mechanic is in the occupation of his
shop when he carries on his business; a merchant,
of his store; a lawyer, of his office; a farmer,
his farm.
It is not necessary, to make his
occupation complete, that the mechanic should
reside in his shop, or upon the same lot. He is in
occupation because he uses and enjoys it in
carrying on his legitimate calling., So with the
merchant, the lawyer, the farmer" (Twiggs v. Land
Commissioners 27 Utah 245:246, 75 Pac. 729, 1904)
As noted by the Court in the Twiggs case, one does not have
to dwell in a building to occupy it.
In this case, Salem Ordinance 2-8 defines a mobile
home as "a dwelling unit . . . "

Salem submits that because

a trailer house is defined as a dwelling unit, does not
limit occupancy to use of the mobile home as a human
habitation.

A fair interpretation of the ordinance requires

the conclusion that occupancy as used in the ordinance was
intended to be broader than that.

Using the mobile home for

storage and not to live in does not make it any less a
mobile home.

A trailer house is still a trailer house
4

whether lived in or used for some other purpose.

It is the

fact of use rather than the kind of use which makes the
occupancy.
Under the police power, government entities all over
the country regulate the location and establish conditions
under which trailer houses may be used.

These regulations

are required because of special problems which trailer house
use entails.

For example, trailers are more vulnerable to

wind upset, are more liable to burn than regular housing and
may be out of place architecturally if located in the midst
of more conventional buildings.

They are often located very

close together which compounds these problems.

It is

illogical to suppose that Salem intended other than the plain
and ordinary meaning of the word
Ordinance 3-17.

"occupied" in Salem

To say that Salem intended this word to mean

solely human habitation would frustrate the obvious intention
of the City Council.
CONCLUSION
An occupied trailer house as referred to in Salem Zoning
Ordinance 3-17 includes the use of a trailer house as a
storage facility and therefore the decision of the Circuit
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Court Judge should be reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

<yw\

Richard M. Taylor for
Tayl&r & Taylor
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM
Salem Ordinances
2-8

Definitions —

Mobile Home shall mean a dwelling unit,

except a sectional home or modular home, designed to be
transported after fabrication on its own wheels or detachable
wheels and which is ready for occupancy as an independent
dwelling unit except for connection to utilities and/or
location on a foundation.

The term mobile home shall not

include conventional houses which are manufactured elsewhere
and moved into an area for use as permanent housing.

3-17 Trailer Houses and Mobile Homes.

No occupied trailer

house or mobile home shall be permitted in Salem City, Utah,
except under the following conditions:

1.

When the trailer house or mobile home is located in

a licensed trailer court or mobile home park.
2.

When the trailer house or mobile home is located on

a lot on which a building is being constructed, provided a
permit to construct a building on such lot has been obtained
from the zoning administrator, but in no event shall the
trailer or mobile home be occupied in excess of one year
without consent of the Salem City Council.
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CIRCUIT COURL STATE OF UTAH
SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT
SALEM CITY
Plaintiff

R U L I N G
CASE NO.

87 CR-202

vs
BRUCE FARNSWORTH
Defendant

This matter came before the Court for Pretrial Conference on the 26th
day of May, 1987.

It was agreed between the parties that the only issue

remaining was a question and the case was submitted to the Court by memoranda in lieu of trial.
After considering the memoranda of counsel, it appears that the case
must turn on the definition of the term "occupied trailer house". The
stipulated facts are to the effect that the trailer is no longer lived in
but is used for storage. The Ordinance itself is not helpful by providing
a definition.

While several possible definitions of "occupy" may be broad

enough to include mere possession or storage, it appears to the Court that
the narrowest fair definitions consistent with the purposes of the statute
lis
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Accordingly, the Court finds and so males that the City has failed to
carry its burden or proof and enters a verdict of acquittal.
DATED: June 29, 1987
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